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BIAS AND THE JOINT TAX RETURAT
[T]ax-law decisions are cultural artifacts - understood as a part of a
larger societal structure and, simultaneously, revealing of that culture.'
. Introduction
The current literature discussing the federal tax laws' gender bias ignores
all racial differences among women.2 Even the few authors who have
acknowledged class distinctions similarly ignore racial differences among
women.3 This Article demonstrates how the literature's gender essentialism
masks the bias in the federal tax laws based upon race, class, and gender in
ways previously ignored.
For example, the literature focuses exclusively on the tax consequences
of married women as marginal or secondary wage earners.4 The literature
1. Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender Roles
in the 1940s, 6 LAW & IsT. REV. 259, 296 (1988).
2. See generally Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L.
Ruv. 1389 (1975); Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income
Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BuFF. L.REv. 49 (1971); PamelaB. Gann,Aban-
doning MaritalStatus as a Factor in Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L.REV. 1(1980);
Majorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint
Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGSL.J. 63 (1993); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation andthe Fam-
ily: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983 (1993);
Toni Robinson & Mary Moers Wenig, Marry in Haste, Repent at Tax Time: Marital Status as
a Tax Determinant, 8 VA. TAX REV. 773 (1989); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income
Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 339 (1994); Laura A. Davis, Note, A Feminist Justification for the
Adoption of an Individual Filing System, 62 S. CAL. L. RuV. 197 (1988). But see Dorothy A.
Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, in TAXING AMERICA 45 (Karen B.
Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) (arguing that, under federal tax law structure, black
taxpayers are more likely to pay marriage penalty, and white taxpayers are more likely to receive
marriage bonus).
3. See Blumberg, supra note 2, at 94 (noting that "[i]f children on A.F.D.C. are likely
to benefit from the dignity their mother derives from gainful employment, there is no reason to
believe that middle class children, particularly girl children, would not also benefit from a
gainfully employed mother"); Edward J. McCaffery, Equality, of the Right Sort, 6 UCLA
WoMEN's L.J. 289, 293-94 (1996) (providing gender wage gap information only for white
workers); McCaffery, supra note2, at 1014-29 (organizing couples by "economic class, because
matters vary quite a bit with income level. Three couples are posited as follows: the Lowers,
where the husband earns $10,000; the Mids, where the husband earns $25,000; and the Uppers,
where the husband earns $60,000"); Robinson & Wenig, supra note 2, at 850-51 (observing that
"marital status tax problems... may be more likely to hurt the pocket books of the poor and to
benefit the better-off").
4. See Bittker, supra note 2, at 1433 ("In a society that takes the husband's job for
granted and views the wife as the secondary wage earner, however, it is reasonable to describe
the existing state of affairs as biased against women."); Blumberg, supra note 2, at 49 ("Thus,
the American working wife should properly be understood as a secondary family earner for the
purpose of determining the work disincentive effect of various Code provisions."); Gann, supra
note 2, at 43 ("Today, the wife typically continues to be the secondary worker; therefore, this
bias in the tax system is most likely to affect her."); Komhauser, supra note 2, at 64 ("By
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concludes that the gender bias of federal tax laws operates to encourage
women to remain at home and out of the waged labor market.' The litera-
ture's solutions, therefore, are designed to encourage women to work more in
the waged labor market.
The literature's gender bias analysis can be correct only if all married
women are marginal wage earners. This Article examines never before pub-
lished Census Bureau data to show that many married women are not marginal
wage earners.6 Accordingly, an analysis of the gender bias in the federal tax
laws from a non-essentialist perspective is needed. This Article provides such
an analysis.
This Article demonstrates that the married women most likely to be mar-
ginal wage earners, namely those who are the exclusive focus of the literature,
are upper-income and white. In addition, the married women least likely to
be marginal wage earners, namely those who were previously ignored by the
literature, are most likely to be African-American. By constructing all fam-
ilies as homogeneous, the literature successfully masks any race, class, or
gender bias that may be embedded in the operation of the federal tax laws. As
Professor Fellows notes, "the hallmark of successful subordination is when
subordinating actions and beliefs become so accepted that they become
indisputable and widely accepted as reflecting fairness and objective truth."7
This Article unmasks the race, class, and gender biases in the federal tax laws
previously ignored by questioning the "indisputable and widely accepted
truth" articulated in the gender bias tax literature that all married women are
marginal wage earners.
'penalizing' the second worker, the joint return discourages married couples from having a
second earner (usually the wife), putting both psychological and economic stress on these
families, on the wife in particular.... ."); McCaffery, supra note 2, at 994 ("Historically, of
course, wives have usually been the marginal earners .... Regardless of the historical pattern,
the realities of childbirth tend to make the married mother a marginal employee."); Zelenak,
supra note 2, at 365 (noting that "a couple [may] viewoi the wife as the marginal wage earner
(in the sense that the husband's job is a given, and the decision to be made is whether the wife
should also take ajob)"); Davis, supra note 2, at 198 (describing wife as "typically the discre-
tionary worker"). But see Michael J. McIntyre, Individual Filing in the Personal Income Tax:
Prolegomena to Future Discussion, 58 N.C. L. REV. 469, 484 (1980) ("If a married woman,
because of a stereotyped view of marriage, views herself as the marginal worker, we might
bemoan the social conventions that have encouraged that perspective, but we have no cause for
complaint against the tax system.").
5. See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
6. Cf Michele Ingrassia &.Pat Wingert, The New Providers, NEWSWEEK, May 22,1995,
at 36,36 ("A new study finds that in nearly half of American households, women earn about as
much as men.").
7. Mary Louise Fellows, The Antisubordination Principle in Tax Policy Discourse (A
Case Study on the Tax Treatment of Child-Care Expenses) 5 (July 1996) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
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Part II provides a summary of the existing gender bias tax literature.8 It
begins with the literature's treatment of all husbands as primary wage earners
and all wives as marginal wage earners.9 It then describes three federal tax
provisions and policies that the literature suggests interact to penalize married
women and their families when married women are marginal wage earners,
namely: (1) the operation ofthejoint return which is designed to treat a married
couple as a single taxable unit;' ° (2) the exclusion from income of the value of
services contributed by a spouse to their household; II and (3) the deductibility
of child care expenses. 2 Part II concludes by describing the literature's
suggested solutions to the gender bias found in the federal tax laws. 3
Part III examines Census Bureau household income data to show how the
literature's treatment of all married women as marginal wage earners is over-
inclusive.' Many married women are not marginal wage earners, but con-
tribute significant amounts to household income. 5 Once differences among
married women are recognized, the federal tax laws must be re-examined for
race, class, and gender biases previously ignored by the literature. For
example, the federal tax laws penalize households in which spouses contribute
roughly equal amounts to household income. 6 This Part shows that African-
American households are more likely to pay a penalty under the federal tax
laws because African-American spouses are more likely to contribute roughly
equal amounts to household income.'7
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. Only a husband and wife can file a joint return. I.R.C. § 6013(a) (1994). Joint
returns, however, are not mandatory. Married couples can also file separate returns, but there
is rarely a tax advantage to doing so. See Bittker, supra note 2, at 1431 (arguing that rate and
schedule for married filing separate returns category "is deliberately designed to prevent sepa-
rate returns from reducing their aggregate tax burden"); see also Anne Alstott, Tax Policy and
Feminism: Competing Goals andlnstitutional Choices, 96 COLUM. L.REv. 2001,2009 (1996);
Brown, supra note 2, at 46 (noting that same-sex couples cannot file joint tax returns);
McCaffery, supra note 2, at 993. See infra notes 41-69 and accompanying text for an analysis
of the joint tax return's impact on married women's incentive to work in the paid labor force.
11. The value of services provided by a spouse to his or her household is referred to as
"imputed income" and is not taxable. See infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
12. Certain child care expenditures are deductible or excluded from gross income calcu-
lation. See I.R.C. §§ 21 and 129 (1994); see also infra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part II.D.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra notes 137, 141 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 203-17 and accompanying text. Although a richer examination would
also include an inspection ofhousehold income for Hispanic-Americans, Asian-Americans, and
Native-Americans, this Article is a first step in the process.
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Part IV examines the solutions previous literature has designed to address
the gender bias found in the federal tax laws. 8 It shows how those suggested
solutions address only the problems of upper-income white women. Those
solutions ignore the race, class, and gender biases observed herein that apply
to the vast majority of women in this country. This Article concludes by
observing that the gender bias in the federal tax laws cannot be solved until
the literature examines racial and class distinctions among women.' 9
1I. The Literature's Focus on Married Women as Marginal Wage Earners
A. Introduction
This Part describes the literature's treatment of married women as
marginal wage earners and the resulting federal income tax consequences. It
begins by describing the very different employment experiences of married
men and women which result in married men being the primary wage earners
and married women being the marginal or secondary wage earners. It then
describes the resulting tax consequences that penalize families in which wives
are marginal wage earners and afford tax benefits to families in which married
women work in the home while their husbands work in the paid labor force. 0
The literature argues that the federal tax laws encourage married women to
work in the home. It concludes by describing the literature's solutions that are
designed to encourage married women to enter the paid labor force.
B. Employment Experiences ofMarried Men and Women
Several authors acknowledge that married women suffer from wage
discrimination,2 although the literature does not uniformly discuss or agree
on the causes of that discrimination. For example, Professor McCaffery
informs us that wage discrimination is more a function of marital status than
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
20. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1035 (noting "behavioral biases of the tax laws
against marriage in general, against two-earner marriages in particular, and in favor of 'all-or-
nothing' labor decisions of secondary earners"); cf Tamar Lewin, Americans Attached to
Traditional Roles for Sexes, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1996, at Al5 (stating "[n]early
half of the Americans surveyed said the ideal family structure was one in which only the father
earned the living and the mother stayed home with the children").
21. See Blumberg, supra note 2, at 90 (describing "prevalent pattern of wage discrimina-
tion"); McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1030 (noting that data demonstrate that "ever married
women (women who were married at some time, whether they are now divorced, widowed, or
still married) are discriminated against in terms of wage levels, whereas never married women
are not, and that women are especially underrepresented in high-level, managerial positions");
Davis, supra note 2, at 211 ("[T]he jobs available to women are generally among the lowest
paid positions .... ).
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gender,' and states that "never married women have virtual wage parity with
men."' However, Professor Zelenak does not acknowledge the existence of
wage discrimination.24
Married women suffer from wage discrimination in the following
manner. The labor market pays married men the most and married women the
least.' Two consequences flow from that fact.
First, married men become more committed to the workplace because
they are compensated for their commitment, while married women become
less committed to the workplace because they are not compensated for their
commitment.26 The labor elasticity for secondary workers, such as married
women, is high and for primary workers, such as husbands, is low.27 Accord-
ingly, as the husband's income increases, the participation rate of the wife
decreases." Married women who can rely upon their husbands' income
choose to stay home and not be subjected to wage discrimination.29
Second, the resulting wage gap between husbands and their wives
minimizes the wives' contribution to household income." Wives earn on
average less than half of what their husbands earn.3 Wives who can rely upon
22. McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1058.
23. Id. at 1039.
24. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 371 ("Having been drawn into the labor force by the lure
of relatively good wages, many women found that they liked the challenge, stimulation, and
psychic rewards of work .... ).
25. In the hierarchy of wages, married men are paid the highest, followed by never-
married men and women who have virtual wage parity with each other, and bringing up the rear
are the ever-married women. See Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender
Discrimination, Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595, 621 (1993).
26. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1039-40.
27. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A
New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1925-26 (1987) ("Nearly all studies
of the labor supply find that married women in general, and married women with young children
in particular, are much more responsive to changes in the tax rate than are men or single
women."); Gann, supra note 2, at 43-44 ("The labor supply elasticity ofhusbands, on the other
hand, remains much lower than that of wives. Accordingly, their labor supply response to
changes in real net wages is much less substantial than that of wives."); McCaffery, supra note
2, at 1038-39 ("But a good deal of evidence supports the proposition that the labor elasticity for
secondary earners in general, and married women in particular, is higher than it is for primary
earners, or husbands.").
28. See Gann, supra note 2, at44 ("The participation rates of husbands in the labor force
generally are higher than those of wives.").
29. Cf McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1058 (observing that unmarried women suffer much
less labor market discrimination than married women).
30. See id. at 994 ("The wage gap between men and women makes the wife's income less
important .... "); see also Blumberg, supra note 2, at 90 (noting existence of"prevalent pattern
of wage discrimination").
31. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 994 ("[Married working women earn, on average,
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their husbands' more highly compensated wages only work if their after-tax
wages are attractive. 2
Although the gender bias literature varies in many respects, each article
contains the same fundamental premise that married men can financially
support their families without their wives working in the paid labor force.3
Professor Bittker, in a frequently cited article, observed over twenty years ago
that "society ... takes the husband's job for granted."34 In a more recent
article, Professor Zelenak suggests that "the wife as marginal wage earner"
exists because her "husband's job is a given."35 Although Professor Mc-
Caffery suggests that "[t]here is no apriori reason to assume the wife should
be the marginal earner,"36 his article is built around three examples, all of
which include husbands as the primary wage earners.37 Further Professor
McCaffery notes that "[h]istorically, of course, wives have usually been the
marginal earners."3 Thus, the literature claims that the families' economic
forty-six percent of what their husbands do.").
32. See id. at 1039 ("[Hlusbands tend to work no matter what, but wives do so only if
their after-tax wages are attractive."); see also Alicia H. Munnell, The Couple Versus the
Individual Under the Federal Personal Income Tax, in THE ECONOMICS oF TAXATION 247, 264
(Henry J. Aaron & Michael J. Boskin eds., 1980) (explaining that "[a]vailable evidence suggests
that the labor supply of primary earners, male or female, is less sensitive to variations in the net
wages than that of secondary workers, wives, and teenagers"). Professor Munnell also states
that "[s]tudies of the labor force activity of males generally have concluded that factors other
than money play the most important role in work motivation and that the labor force partic-
ipation of males is affected little by the income tax." Id. at 264.
33. See Bittker, supra note 2, at 1433 (indicating that"society... takes the husband's job
for granted and views the wife as the secondary wage earner"); Blumberg, supra note 2, at 49
("Thus, the American working wife should properly be understood as a secondary family earner
for the purpose of determining the work disincentive effect ofvarious Code provisions."); Gann,
supra note 2, at 43 ("Today, the wife typically continues to be the secondary worker .... );
Kormhauser, supra note 2, at 64 ("By 'penalizing' the second worker, the joint return dis-
courages married couples from having a second earner (usually the wife). . . ."); McCaffery,
supra note 2, at 994 ("Historically, of course, wives have usually been the marginal earners.");
Zelenak, supra note 2, at 365 (stating that "couple views the wife as the marginal wage earner
(in the sense that the husband's job is a given... )"); Davis, supra note 2, at 198 (describing
wife as "typically the discretionary worker").
34. Bittker, supra note 2, at 1433.
35. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 365.
36. McCaffery, supra note 2, at 993. Professor McCaffery also acknowledges that "it is
certainly possible, for example, that both spouses might be equally marginal ... ." Id. Appar-
ently Professor McCaffery cannot conceive of women as the primary wage earners. See infra
note 137 and accompanying text.
37. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1014 (hypothesizing on effect of tax laws on lower-,
middle-, and upper-class married couples, and explaining that "[i]n each case, the salary of the
husband is fixed in order to focus on the marginal decision facing the wife as she decides
whether or not to enter the work force, and at what level of activity").
38. Id. at 994.
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survival is not dependent upon wives working outside the home, but upon
husbands working outside the home and wives working inside the home.
Given that husbands earn considerably more in the paid labor force, they
are the primary wage earners. Given that wives earn considerably less in the
paid labor force than their husbands, they are the marginal wage earners.
Labor force discrimination encourages wives to work at home and husbands
to work in the paid labor force. Next, the literature observes how the federal
tax laws similarly encourage wives to work at home and husbands to work in
the paid labor force.
C. The Federal Tax Laws Penalize Married Women Who Are
Marginal Wage Earners
This subpart focuses on three tax policies and provisions that penalize
married women: first, thejoint return provision of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 ("Code"), as amended; 9 second, the exclusion from income ofthevalue
of services contributed by wives to their households; and third, the limited
deductibility of work related expenses, such as child care expenditures."
1. The Joint Return Penalizes Married Women in the Paid Labor Force
Congress enacted the Revenue Act of 1948 which permitted the filing
ofjoint returns. 1 The existing tax literature suggests that the joint tax return
was "put in place at a time when traditional families - meaning house-
holds with men working outside the home and women working inside the
home - were dominant."42 When Congress enacted the joint return pro-
visions in 1948, eighty percent of all American families were single-income
39. I.R.C. § 6013 (1994).
40. Although numerous commentators have described other Code provisions that penalize
married women, this Article will only focus on the three described in the text. See, e.g., James
E. Maule, Tax and Marriage: Unhitching the Horse and the Carriage, 67 TAX NOTES 539,
544-46 (1995) (explaining phase-outs and other limitations that increase marriage penalty);
McCaffery, supranote2, at 996-1001, 1010-13 (examining behavioral effects of social security
taxation and describing behavioral effects of fringe benefit taxation rules).
41. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471,62 Stat. 110 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see Stanley Surrey, Federal Taxation ofthe Family- the Revenue
Act of 1948, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1097, 1106 (1948). For an excellent discussion of how the
larger societal assumptions about women and income splitting became part of the Code when
Congress permitted the joint return, see generally Jones, supra note 1.
42. McCaffery, supra note 2, at 987-88; see also Bittker, supra note 2, at 1413 (arguing
that "enactment of the income-splitting joint return meant that the political credit for reducing
taxes was concentrated on Congress rather than dispersed among the State legislatures"); Jones,
supra note 1, at 296 (stating that income splitting joint return "was viewed as a way of con-
serving traditional gender roles and power relationships"); Zelenak, supra note 2, at 347
(positing that joint return "legislation was essentially a historical accident- a response to the
geographic discrimination and legal confusion resulting from the [Supreme Court's decisions]").
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households.43
The joint return treats married couples as a single taxable unit. 4 It was
designed to tax two married households with the same total wage income
equally regardless of whether one or both spouses were in the paid labor force
in each household.45 Accordingly, two married couples with the same total
wage income will be taxed equally even though one couple has a sole wage
earner and the other couple has two wage earners.46
The filing of a joint return means the second wage earner's income is
added to the primary wage earner's income and is taxed at a higher rate than
if the second wage earner filed individually.47 That higher rate is due to the
progressive tax rate structure.48 The progressive tax rate structure benefits the
primary wage earner whose first dollar of earnings is taxed at the lower rate
and penalizes the second wage earner whose first dollar is taxed at the highest
tax rate at which the primary wage earner's last dollar was taxed.4 1 The
literature also states that men are more than five times more likely to be the
single earner in single-earner households."0
43. Richard L. Elbert, Comment, Love, God, and Country: Religious Freedom and the
Marriage Penalty Tax, 5 CONST. L.J. 1171, 1180 (1995). This author has unsuccessfully at-
tempted to obtain the racial breakdown of the 80% figure.
44. I.R.C. § 6013(a) (1994).
45. See Bittker, supra note 2, at 1395 ("Since 1948, however, the Internal Revenue Code
has imposed the same liability on all equal-income married couples, whether the combined
income is generated by the earnings or investments of one spouse or both and without regard
to the division of ownership between them.").
46. This concept is commonly referred to as "equal taxes for equal-income married
couples." Bittker, supra note 2, at 1395. But see Jones, supra note 1, at261 (stating that"equal
taxes for equal income" argument forjoint return was articulated "in a more sophisticated form"
after the fact); Zelenak, supra note 2, at 342-43 (noting thatjoint return legislation "was an ad
hoe response to tax discrimination between residents of community property and separate
property states, caused by two Supreme Court opinions"). Professor Bittker further states that
the principle of "equal taxes for equal-income married couples" was "'almost universally
accepted' by tax theorists...." Bittker, supra note 2, at 1395 (quoting JOSEPH A. PECHMAN,
FEDERAL TAXPOLICY 87-88 (rev. ed. 1971)). What Professor Bittker ignores is the argument
that those two couples do not have equal economic income because the tax laws do not tax the
value of services provided by a spouse for the benefit of other household members, making the
one wage-earning couple economically better off because it receives the spouse's services with-
out incurring any taxable income. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 362 (arguing that "one-earner
couple is significantly better off because of its greater imputed income from self-performed
services and its lesser nondeductible work-related expenses").
47. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 339-40 (noting that spouses report their combined
income on joint returns and calculate their tax liability on that combined income).
48. See id. at 339.
49. See Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 64 ("By 'penalizing' the second worker, the joint
return discourages married couples from having a second earner (usually the wife) ...
50. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 994.
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Single-income households benefit most from joint filing because they
receive a marriage bonus." The marriage bonus is greater the more unequal
the household income split, with the greatest bonus to the household in which
one taxpayer earns 100% of the income. 2 The literature provides that today,
in contrast to conditions in 1948, fewer than ten percent of Americans live in
the "traditional" family, with a husband working in the paid labor force and
a wife working solely in the home. 3
Joint filing penalizes two income households by subjecting them to a
marriage penalty. 4 The marriage penalty operates to add the first dollar of the
wife's salary to her husband's last dollar of salary which will be taxed at the
husband's marginal tax rate. Two-earner married couples, therefore, pay a
higher total tax than two single individuals with the same earnings. Generally,
the marriage penalty does not begin until one spouse earns twenty percent of
what the other does.56 The marriage penalty is greatest when the household
income is divided evenly.57 Table 2.1 below describes the marriage penalty
and bonus afforded by the joint return. 8
Proportionately, however, the marriage penalty is greatest for low-income
individuals due to the operation of the earned income tax credit ("EITC").
59
51. See Brown, supra note 2, at 46; Zelenak, supra note 2, at 340-41; Elbert, supra note
43, at 1182 n.52; see also Mary L. Heen, Welfare Reform, Child Care Costs, and Taxes: Deliv-
ering Increased Work-Related Child Care Benefits to Low-Income Families, 13 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 173, 210 n.216 (1995) (defining marriage bonus).
52. See infra Table 2.1, at p. 1480 (demonstrating that marriage bonus is greatest when
household has single wage earner).
53. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 985-86.
54. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 340-41; Elbert, supra note 43, at 1182.
55. See Bittker, supra note 2, at 1431 ("[T]he second salary is added to the first in
computing their combined taxable income, with the result that the first dollar of the second
salary is taxed at the marginal rate applicable to the last dollar of the first salary."); Zelenak,
supra note 2, at 343 ("The current system strongly discourages a married woman from seeking
employment by stacking her income on top of her husband's, so that even her first dollar of
income is taxed at a high marginal rate.").
56. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1016. Professor McCaffery additionally notes that
this is not true for low-income taxpayers otherwise eligible for the earned income credit. Id.
57. John Brozovsky & A.J. Cataldo II, A HistoricalAnalysis of the "Marriage Tax Pen-
alty", 21 ACCT. HISTORIANS J. 163, 166 (1994); see infra Table 2.1, at p. 1480 (demonstrating
that greatest marriage penalty falls upon households in which income is contributed evenly).
58. See infra Table 2.1, at p. 1480.
59. See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit andthe Limitations of Tax-Based
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REv. 533, 559-64 (1995); McCaffery, supra note 2, at 995; see
also Philip Jagolinzer & John M. Strefeler, Marital Status and the Taxes We Pay, 161 J. ACC.
68, 74 (1986) (stating that "[tjhe earned income credit may produce one of the most extreme
instances ofmarital discrimination"); Ellen E. Schultz, Living in Sin to Cut TaxBill WouldLook
Even Better to Some Under Clinton Plan, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1993, at Cl ("Calculations
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Table 2.1
THE MARRIAGE TAX (PENALTY)/BONUS BY INCOME
& ALLOCATION BETWEEN SPOUSES (1993)60
INCOME ALLOCATION
INCOME 0%/100% 10%190% 20%/80% 30%/70% 40%160%. 50%/50%
$20,000 728 428 128 (173) (180) (180)
$30,000 968 278 (173) (180) (180) (180)
$40,000 2,268 1,148 321 (180) (180) (180)
$50,000 3,282 1,882 1,075 425 (226) (466)
$60,000 3,296 1,602 815 35 (746) (1,285)
$70,000 3,596 1,568 555 (356) (1,266) (1,285)
$80,000 3,896 1,708 428 (746) (1,285) (1,285)
$90,000 4,196 1,848 408 (1,032) (1,285) (1,285)
$100,000 4,497 1,990 390 (970) (1,270) (1,284)
$125,000 4,695 1,590 (411) (1,195) (1,570) (1,857)
$150,000 5,945 1,887 (970) (1,420) (1,857) (1,859)
$200,000 5,990 882 (84) (3,364) (4,312) (4,312)
$500,000 6,164 (4,203) (8,789) (11,642) (13,442) (15,024)
The EITC marriage penalty is a function of its phase-out provisions being
identical for single and married individuals. 61 The basic rate structure marri-
prepared for The Wall Street Journal by KPMG Peat Marwick show that the marriage penalty
has the greatest impact on the lowest wage earners with children."). See I.R.C. § 32 (1994) for
the definition of and the rules applicable to the EITC.
60. John Brozovsky & A.J. Cataldo II, The Marriage Tax Penalty: Inequities and Tax
Planning Opportunities, OHIo CPAJ., Dec. 1993, at 21, 22 (table reprinted with permission of
publisher). This chart describes the marriage bonus (or penalty) paid by married couples when
compared with what they would have paid had they remained single. For example, a sole wage
earner household (00/o/100%) earning $20,000 of income would receive a marriage bonus of
$728.00. The chart ignores the EITC's marriage penalty or marriage bonus.
61. See Alstott, supra note 59, at 561-62; Jonathan Barry Forman, SimplificationforLow-
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age penalty does not begin until incomes are 20% apart, while the EITC
marriage penalty begins with the first dollar earned by the second wage
earner. 2 The marriage penalty for low-income individuals has been estimated
to be as high as 9% of total income in certain instances.63 The marriage pen-
alty created by the EITC is a greater percentage of income than the penalty
created by the progressive rate structure coupled with the joint return."
The EITC is generally unavailable to the lesser-earning spouse. 5 In
1996, a single individual with two children and $10,000 of earned income
would be eligible for an EITC of $3,556.6 Ifthat person married another with
$10,000 of earned income and two children (who would have been eligible for
the EITC of $3,556 but for the marriage), as a couple, they could claim an
EITC of $1,789.7 That results in a total marriage penalty of $5,323.68 Alter-
natively, a marriage bonus can result in the operation of the EITC in the fol-
lowing manner. If a childless worker earning $10,000 marries a nonworker
with two children, the couple could claim an EITC of $3,556.69 Neither would
be eligible for the EITC before they married.70
2. The Failure to Tax Imputed Income Encourages Married
Women to Work at Home
The value of services a wife performs for herself or her family, com-
monly referred to as imputed income, is not taxable to the family unit.71 The
Income Taxpayers: Some Options, 57 OHIo ST. L.J. 145, 184 (1996); Zelenak, supra note 2,
at 364.
62. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1016.
63. Middle-Income TaxProposals: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on Finance, 104th
Cong. 48 (1995) (statement of Deborah H. Schenk) (describing following hypothetical:
"[U]sing 1994 rates, two single taxpayers each earning $13,000 would be entitled to a $1,174
EITC or a combined $2,348. Ifthey married, they would have no EITC. Their marriage penalty
is $2,348 or 9% of their total income."); see also Alstott, supra note 59, at 562; McCaffery,
supra note 2, at 1015-16 (suggesting that earned income tax credit "marriage penalty" can be
as high as $2,878).
64. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 364; see also Forman, supra note 60, at 184.
65. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1017.
66. See Jonathan Barry Forman, What Can Be Done AboutMarriage Penalties?, 30 FAM.
L.Q. 1, 8 (1996).
67. Id.
68. The EITC of $3,556 for each single person totals $7,112 if they do not marry. As a
couple, their EITC is $1,789. They lose $5,323 in tax benefits under the EITC as a result of
marriage.
69. See Forman, supra note 66, at 8; see also Alstott, supra note 59, at 562 n. 116 (stating
that if childless worker marries nonworker with children, couple may receive higher EITC than
if individuals remain single).
70. Forman, supra note 66, at 8-9.
71. JOSEPHM.DODGEETAL.,FEDERALINCOMETAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTUREANDPOLICY
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value of services performed by a wife outside of her home in return for wages
is taxable income.72 The failure to tax imputed income creates a tax incentive
for women to work in the home and not in the paid labor force.71 By per-
forming housekeeping and child care services herself, the wife obtains a tax
benefit for her family.74
Wives, therefore, are forced to compare the after-tax costs of paid labor
with nontaxable imputed income.7 ' The exclusion of imputed income, coupled
with the marriage penalty, encourages marginal wage earners to work inside
the home, and not in the paid labor force.76 In many instances, such a calcu-
lation will influence the wife to work at home and will result in a single-earner
household. 7
3. The Limited Deductibility of Work-Related Expenses Penalizes
Married Women Who Work in the Paid Labor Force
Work-related expenses that are not deductible by working mothers
include commuting, job training, clothing, and child care.7" Although all
workers face the non-deductibility issue, the literature suggests that the lim-
ited deductibility of work-related expenses compounds the Code's gender bias
by ignoring the unique circumstances faced by working mothers.79 The
literature focuses primarily on the limited deductibility of child care expenses.
As a result, the balance of this section will be so confined.
55-57 (1995) ("It has always been assumed that Congress has never intended to tax imputed
income from services or property."); LAURiEL. MALMANETAL., PROBLEMS, CASES ANDMATER-
iALS ON FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 322-23 (1994); see also 1 BORIS I. BITTKER& LAWRENCE
LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS § 5.3.1 (2d ed. 1992) (stating that
congressional silence indicates that Congress never intended to tax imputed income).
72. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (1994); see also Gann, supra note 2, at 40.
73. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1001; Zelenak, supra note 2, at 363, 372.
74. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1003.
75. See id. at 1004; Zelenak, supra note 2, at 372.
76. See Gann, supra note 2, at 41.
77. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1004.
78. See id at 1009. Housekeeping services are only deductible ifthey relate to child care.
Zelenak, supra note 2, at 373 ("And housekeeping expenses not related to child care are not
eligible for any tax benefit").
79. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1009 (noting three responses to argument that all
employees, not just working wives, incur such costs: first, married women may incur higher
entry costs into paid labor force including child care and loss of nonmarket time spent on
family; second, typical employee benefits from standard deduction that second wage earner wife
does not; third, there is no reason to equate married working mothers with all other employees).
But see Zelenak, supra note 2, at 373-74 (noting that limited deductibility of work-related
expenses is not problem caused by joint returns.)
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The limited deductibility of child care expenses penalizes the working
mother in the paid labor force.8" When married mothers decide to enter or re-
enter the paid labor force, they incur child care expenses, which the courts
have held are nondeductible."' Currently the Code has two provisions, Sec-
tions 21 and 129, which afford limited tax relief to families that incur child
care expenses. 2
Section 21 is a tax credit that cannot exceed the earned income of the
lesser earning spouse. 3 This provision permits a credit based on an applicable
percentage of child care expenses, with limits. Section 21 is helpful, but does
not equal the benefit of a full deduction."
The exclusion of Section 129 is only available when a dependant care
plan is provided by an employer.8 5 Only one-third of full-time employees at
private firms were eligible for such plans in 1991 86 Taxpayers must choose
between the provisions of Sections 21 and 129 -they cannot take advantage
of both. 7
4. Summary
If a wife decides to enter the paid labor force, she will have to take into
account several factors. Her wage income will be depressed as a result of
labor force discrimination.8 She will be taxed on her wage income at her
husband's highest (marginal) tax rate. 9 If she is a mother, child care expenses
will be paid out of her wages. 90
80. See Smith v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939), affdper curiam, 113 F.2d 114
(2d Cir. 1940); Zelenak, supra note 2, at 363, 372-73.
81. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1006 (citing Smith, 40 B.T.A. at 1039-40). For a
more complete discussion of the decision, see Blumberg, supra note 2, at 63-66; Fellows, supra
note 7, at 113-20.
82. See I.R.C. §§ 29, 129 (1994); see also McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1007-10; Zelenak,
supra note 2, at 372-73 & n.166.
83. See I.R.C. § 21 (1994); McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1007.
84. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1007; Zelenak, supra note 2, at 372-73 ("Child care
expenses are eligible for a credit, but for many taxpayers the credit falls far short of equaling
the benefit of a full deduction.").
85. See I.R.C. § 129 (1994); McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1008.
86. See Heen, supra note 51, at 191-92; cf Zelenak, supra note 2, at373 ("The exclusion,
however, has not been made widely available by employers. The revenue cost of the exclusion
for 1993 has been estimated at only $635 million, compared with $2.955 billion for the child
care credit.").
87. See Heen, supra note 51, at 192.
88. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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The tax consequences of a wife's decision not to enter the paid labor
force are decidedly different. She will not be subjected to depressed wages
as a result of discrimination.91 Her family will receive a marriage bonus - not
a penalty.92 By performing services for her family, she does not incur
expenditures for which deductions may be limited and such services are not
taxable income.93
The literature concludes that tax and labor policies encourage married
marginal wage earners to remain at home and out of the paid labor market.94
The current system reinforces job discrimination and gender role stereotypes
and keeps women out of the labor force who would otherwise be effective role
models.95 Encouraged to work at home, married women become increasingly
dependent upon their husbands for their economic survival.96 The next section
describes the literature's solutions to the gender bias found in the federal tax
laws.
D. Solutions: Federal Tax Laws Must Encourage Married Women to
Increase Their Participation in the Paid Labor Force
Implicit in the literature's proposed solutions is the idea that tax laws
influence behavior. Whether taxes change behavior requires an empirical
analysis of the specific tax law in question.97 There is, however, widespread
support for the proposition that taxes influence behavior.98
91. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
94. See Blumberg, supra note 2, at 92-93 ("The national social policy reflected in disin-
centive provisions is simply expressed: a married woman ought to stay at home unless her
family is virtually destitute, that is, in danger of becoming or presently a public charge."); Gann,
supra note 2, at 41 ("The aggregation of market income under a progressive tax rate structure
discourages the spouse considered by the couple to be the secondary worker (typically the wife)
from working outside the home. . . ."); McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1028 ("Encouraging upper
income women to stay home deprives women of powerful, and symbolically important, roles.
The evidence of discrimination against women in upper management continues to be pervas-
ive."); Davis, supra note 2, at 214 ("By encouraging married women to remain at home, the
current system reinforcesjob discrimination and sexual stereotypes abhorrentto the goals of the
women's movement."). Professor Blumberg makes the further point that because welfare
mothers are told to work and "[i]f children on A.F.D.C. are likely to benefit from the dignity
their mother derives from gainful employment, there is no reason to believe that middle-class
children, particularly girl children, would not also benefit from a gainfully employed mother."
Blumberg, supra note 2, at 94.
95. See Blumberg, supra note 2, at 94.
96. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 363.
97. As Professor Alstott has noted, there is empirical evidence that the marriage penalty
has a small impact on the decision to marry. See Alstott, supra note 10, at 2011 (citing James
Aim & Leslie A. Whittington, Does the Income Tax Affect Marital Decisions?, 48 NAT'L TAX
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1. Abolish Joint Return
The most popular solution the literature proposes is the abolition of the
joint return." If individuals were required to file separate returns, the Code
would be marriage neutral. Tax liability would not change when one's marital
status changed. There would be neither marriage penalties nor bonuses.
Wives would no longer be discouraged from working in the paid labor
force."° Although acknowledging the difficulty in implementing such a
J. 565, 571 (1995); David L. Sjoquist & Mary B. Walker, The Marriage Tax andthe Rate and
Timing of Marriage, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 547, 556 (1995)). Yet the empirical evidence does not
address whether the analysis changes based upon the class or race of those seeking to marry.
98. DODGEETAL., supra note 71, at 22 ("No tax system can be completely neutral, how-
ever, because some activities will always be affected by taxation.... [Tihe income tax unavoid-
ably interferes with people's decisions about how much to work."); SANFORD M. GUERIN &
PHILPF. POSTLEWAITE, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 15 (4th ed.
1994); WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 3-4 (10th ed.
1994). Professors Guerin and Postlewaite explain:
The increased use of tax provisions to effectuate economic goals reflects the theory
that individual taxpayers' economic decisions are often based on the tax effects
flowing from those decisions. With this in mind, Congress has promulgated incen-
tive and disincentive provisions in an attempt to manipulate individual economic
decisions.... The child care credit is a current example of such efforts. In part to
encourage those with small children to enter the job market, Congress provided a
tax credit for child care expenses incurred while the taxpayer is at work. In
addition, the provision serves to encourage employment opportunities for those
rendering the child care services.
GuERN & POSTLEWAITE, supra, at 15. Also, Professors Klein and Bankman state:
The income tax has also had a substantial effect on the allocation of resources in
our economy, on the ways in which people invest their time and their money;
indeed, it has affected our lives in the broadest sense.... Economists differ in their
views of many of the economic effects of such provisions, but one effect is clear:
Incentive provisions contribute substantially to the complexity of the law and to the
need for tax advice in planning business and other activities.
KLEIN & BANKMAN, supra, at 3-4.
99. See Blumberg, supra note 2, at 95 (arguing for mandatory separate returns); Gann,
supra note 2, at 3 (same); Kormhauser, supra note 2, at 108 (arguing that joint return ought to
be abolished and replaced by system that treats each person as separate taxable unit); Maule,
supra note 40, at 548 (arguing for mandatory separate returns); McCaffery, supra note 2, at
1035 (arguing for separate tax rates); Robinson & Wenig, supra note 2, at 850 ("Abandoning
marital status as a determinant of tax liability would simultaneously eliminate much of the
complexity that currently plagues the average taxpayer."); Jeanette Anderson Winn & Marshall
Winn, Till Death Do We Split: Married Couples and Single Persons Under the Individual
Income Tax, 34 S.C.L. REV. 829,869 (1983) (arguing formandatory separate returns); Zelenak,
supra note 2, at 381 (same).
100. See Kormhauser, supra note 2, at 109 (noting that "[s]tudies show that the wages of
the second earner, usually the wife, are sensitive to the tax rate, whereas the wages of married
men and singles are relatively insensitive").
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system, 01 most commentators have not attempted to work through the difficult
theoretical issues." Professor Zelenak is one of the few to have addressed in
detail the allocation issues of mandatory individual filing. 3
2. Tax Imputed Income
Some commentators suggest that if imputed income was taxed, the
federal tax laws would not discourage women from entering the paid labor
force. ' If wives' contributions to the household were taxed, whether they
were made in the home or made from wages in the paid labor force, single
wage-earning couples would be treated like dual wage-earning couples.'
3. Provide Tax Incentives for Wives in the Paid Labor Force
One suggestion is to allow a deduction for all expenses that result from
the second wage earner's decision to work."° An alternative is either a lim-
ited deduction or credit as a percentage of the second wage earner's wages.'07
Professor McCaffery as well as others suggest, as a possible solution, a higher
101. See Gann, supra note 2, at 32; Kornhauser, supra note 2, at 108 n.146. Professor
Kornhauser also notes that "[tjhe individual return is abetter solution than thejoint return." Id.
at 11.
102. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 344 ("These issues are commonly glossed over by
advocates of separate returns.").
103. See id. at343, 381-401 (discussing "problems of allocatingproperty income and item-
ized deductions between spouses under separate returns"); see also Kornhauser, supra note 2,
at 108 n.146.
104. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 403 ("O'Kelley solves this problem, however, by
requiring that the non-earning spouse include $10,000 imputed income from homemaking
services in her taxable income." (citing Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Tax Policyfor Post-Liberal
Society: A Flat-Tax-Inspired Redefinition of the Purpose and Ideal Structure ofa Progressive
Income Tax, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 727,744-51,764 (1985))); cf Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing House-
work, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1618 (1996) (discussing benefits of taxing value of services provided
by spouses to members of their household).
105. See Zelenak, supra note 2, at 403.
106. See Bittker, supra note 2, at 1433-34 (acknowledging following difficulties in admin-
istering such deduction provision: (1) determining whichjob-related expenses would be deduc-
tible; (2) potential for taxpayer manipulation of any deduction standard with "self-serving
declarations;" and (3) eliminating that portion of additional expenses that generate some "per-
sonal" benefits). Professor Bittker acknowledges the difficulty of administering such a system.
Id.; see also Blumberg, supra note 2, at 95 (proposing "earned income allowance for secondary
family earners" and suggesting changes to existing limits on child care deductions that would
enable more families to receive benefits); McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1042, 1059 (suggesting
"reinstituting atwo-eamer deduction, or otherwise encouraging secondary-worker participation"
and proposing refundable child care credit).
107. See Bittker, supra note 2, at 1434-35. This became law in 1981 and was repealed in
1986. I.R.C. § 221 (repealed 1986); see Zelenak, supra note 2, at 360.
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tax on primary earners to finance a subsidy for secondary earners.! 8 Under
that proposal, if a wife stayed home she would be taxed on the foregone sub-
sidy that would have been available to her under the proposal had she worked
in the paid labor force."° Alternatively, if a husband responded to the
increased tax rates by reducing his participation in the paid labor force, and
instead worked inside the home, he would receive a full imputed income
bonus. °
4. Subsidize Employers that Hire Wives
Only Professor McCaffery suggests that the tax laws should subsidize
employers who hire wives."' As McCaffery acknowledges, the difficulties
with implementation may be insurmountable." 2 Accordingly, this proposal
is not considered in extensive detail here.
5. Replace Progressive Rate Structure with Flat Tax
A few commentators support a flat tax as a way to solve the problem."'
By eliminating the progressive tax rates, the second earner's wages would not
be taxed at her spouse's higher marginal tax rate. The proposals have many
similarities. They include a rather large deduction for personal exemptions
and a flat tax rate for the balance of taxable income, with mandatory separate
returns." 4 The commentators disagree about including imputed income in the
tax base."' A flat tax would significantly decrease the marriage penalties and
bonuses, but would not eliminate them." 6 An increased personal exemption
108. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1052; cf Gann, supra note 2, at 44 ("Congress could
more efficiently tax married couples if it applied the higher tax rate to the husband's income
rather than to the wife's income.").
109. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1005.
110. See id. Yet given Professor McCaffery's observation that the labor elasticity for
married men is lower than that of married women, it may not be realistic to expect that married
men will work inside the home. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
111. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1052 ("One approach might be to subsidize firms that
hire married women.").
112. See id. (discussing uncertainty surrounding "firm-side remedy").
113. See Michael C. Lovell, On Taxing Marriages, 35 NAT'L TAXJ. 507, 507-09 (1982);
Maule, supra note 40, at 548; O'Kelley, supra note 104, at 766-69; see also Zelenak, supra note
2, at 402-04 (acknowledging flat tax as solution, but then determining that it causes more
inequities than it solves).
114. See Maule, supra note 40, at 548; O'Kelley, supra note 104, at 766-69.
115. Professor Maule would not include imputed income. Maule, supra note 40, at 548.
Professor O'Kelley would include imputed income. O'Kelley, supra note 104, at 744-51,764.
Professor Zelenak observes that O'Kelley's proposal would offset the imputed income by the
wife's personal exemption, resulting in no net benefit. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 403.
116. See Forman, supra note 66, at 5-7. Professor Forman states that "[c]onsequently,
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would minimize, if not eliminate, many nondeductibility problems of married
women.
1I. Unmasking the Race, Class, and Gender Bias in the Federal Tax Laws
A. Introduction
This Part provides a more inclusive gender analysis by describing the
labor force experiences of African-American and white wives and the differ-
ing impact of the federal tax laws based upon those experiences. It begins by
describing those labor force experiences which seek to privilege white males
at the expense of white women and African-Americans.117 It then provides an
analysis of spousal contributions to total household income in African-Amer-
ican and white households."' In describing the contributions to household
income based upon race, this Article provides information never before
published. It then applies the three federal tax policies described in Part II to
the analysis of spousal contributions described in this Part to demonstrate that
the literature's focus on married women as marginal wage earners and married
men as primary wage earners hides the race, class, and gender bias of the
federal tax laws." 9
B. The Race, Class, and Gender Bias in the Waged Labor Force
This subpart approaches the issue in a unique way by describing the labor
force experiences of husbands and wives in African-American and white
households. 2 Husbands and wives are treated differently in the labor force
based upon their race, class, and gender - not merely their marital status, as
the literature suggests.'
even a 'flat' tax system would end up violating the couples neutrality principle, or the marriage
neutrality principle, or both." IaM at 7.
117. See infra Part III.B.
118. See infra Part III.C.
119. See infra Part II.D.
120. See Ingrassia & Wingert, supra note 6, at 36 (discussing new study which shows that
in nearly half of U.S. families women earn about as much as men).
121. See TERESAAMOTT&JuLiEMATrHAEI, RACE, GENDER,&WORK 27 (1991) ("Women
throughoutthe United States havenot experienced acommon oppression as women."); NATALIE
J. SOKOLOFF, BLACK WOMEN AND WHITE WOMEN IN THE PROFESSIONS 3 (1992). Professor
Sokoloff states:
Although discrimination on the basis of gender has been (and continues to be)
directed against women of all races, racial discrimination is at least as important a
factor in the work lives of racial/ethnic minority women. In short, the experiences
of minority women and white women are not the same.
1488
BIAS AND THE JOINT TAX RETURN
Married white men earn the highest salaries, with a mean annual wage
of $39,389 for 1990."2 The next highest paid group is married African-
American men, with a mean annual wage of $27,026." 3 Married African-
American men earn 68.61% of what married white men earn.1 24 They are
followed by married white women who have a mean annual wage of
$23,493."2 They earn 59.64% of what married white men earn, and 86.92%
of what married African-American men earn.1 16 The lowest paid are married
African-American women who have a mean annual wage of $20,693.127 They
earn 76.57% of what married African-American men earn, 52.53% of what
married white men earn, and 88.08% of what married white women earn.
1 28
When considering full-time workers, African-American women earn
about 6% less than white women.'29 Their earnings are lower at all educa-
tional levels. 30 African-American wives have higher labor force participation
rates than white wives.' Married African-American women are much more
likely to work full time than their white counterparts.' Unlike women of
other racial groups, married African-American women with young children
are more likely to participate in the labor force than married African-Amer-
ican women as a group.' Notwithstanding that data, Professor McCaffery
says "studies confrmn that many married mothers do stay home - the labor
force participation rate of married mothers with young children is only slightly
more than 50 percent."' 34 This Article seeks to point out the dangers of view-
122. BUREAUOFTHE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., SERIEs P60, No. 174, MONEYINcOME
OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILES, AND PERSONS IN THE U.S., 1990, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
tbl. 28 (1991) (Table of Marital Status - Persons 18 Years Old and Over, by Total Money
Income in 1990, Race, Hispanic Origin, Sex, and Work Experience in 1990) [hereinafter BuR-
EAU OF THE CENSUS].
123. Id.
124. See id.; see also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF BLACK
WOMEN: ANEXPLORATORYINVESTIGATION 15 (1990) (notingthat on average, marriedblackmen
earn two-thirds as much as married white men) [hereinafter U.S. COMM'N ON CWvL RIGHTS].




129. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 124, at 13.
130. Id.
131. See id. (finding thatAfican-American and Asian women are more likely to participate
in labor force than white women and women from other minority groups).
132. Id. at 105.
133. Id. at 13. The percentage of married African-American women who participated in
the paid labor force in 1980 is 60.5%, and for married African-American women with children
the percentage is 65.2%. Id.
134. McCaffery, supra note 2, at 1024 (citingNancy E. Dowd, WorkandFamily: Restruc-
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ing women as an homogenous group. As previously stated, African-American
wives are much more likely to hold full-time jobs than their white counter-
parts.' Viewing women as an homogenous group may lead to results that do
not account for the experiences of African-American women.
As aresult of different labor force experiences, husbands and wives make
different household contributions based upon their race and class.'36 All
married women are not marginal wage earners and all married men are not
primary wage earners. 17 Those household contributions that differ as a result
of race and class determine the extent of the marriage penalty paid, or
marriage bonus received, by taxpayers.
C. Analysis of Spousal Contributions to Household Income by
Race, Class, and Gender
1. Household Contributions by African-American Husbands and Wives'38
"Married African-American women contribute a substantially higher
percentage of their family income than married white women."'139 This
difference has been partially attributed to the fact that other family members
contribute relatively less to family income in African-American households
turing the Worllace, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 431, 443-44 (1990)). "Marriage decreases the likeli-
hood that women are in the workforce and weakens their labor market position." Dowd, supra,
at 444 (stating that bare majority of mothers with children under age six are employed).
135. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RGIiTS, supra note 124, at 105.
136. See Alstott, supra note 10, at 2025-26 (noting that discrepancy leads to disparate
treatment under different tax plans); Brown, supra note 2, at 49-50 (highlighting differences in
household contributions made by African-American and white women); Beverly I. Moran &
William Whitford, A Black Critique ofthe Internal Revenue Code, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 751,794-
96. Perhaps not coincidentally, African-American women have significantly lower marriage
rates than white women. As of 1990, approximately 30% of African-American women were
married whereas 55% of white women were married. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COM., PUB. No. 1990-CP-1-1, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION, GENERAL POPULATION CHARAC-
TERISTICS, tbl. 40 (1992).
137. See infra Table 3.1, at p. 1492; infra Table 3.2, atp. 1496.
138. This section only includes data on same-race couples, given the small percentages of
interracial married couples. See Brown, supra note 2, at49 ("[I]n 1985, 98.9 percent of black
married women and 96.6 percent of black married men had a black spouse."); Linda Mathews,
More Than Identity Rides On a New Racial Category, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1996, at Al.
Mathews states:
Only 6 percent of black men and 2 percent of black women marry outside their race,
compared to 12 percent of Asian men, 25 percent of Asian women, and 59 percent
of American Indian men and 60 percent of American Indian women. For whites,
1.6 percent of the men and 1.4 percent of the women marry non-whites.
Id.
139. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 124, at 99.
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than in white households. 4 ' A 1990 study showed that although married
African-American women contributed on average approximately 40% to total
household income, married white women contributed on average approxi-
mately 29%.14 Those averages, which suggest racial differences, hide class
differences. This section explores those different contribution percentages at
every income level among African-American and white households.
This section examines the contributions to household income by African-
American husbands and wives at all income levels. Table 3.1 describes the
percentage of household income contributed by African-American wives
based upon 1990 Census Bureau data.' Table 3.1 also describes the house-
hold contributions for African-American husbands. Whatever percent of
household income not contributed by the wife is contributed by the husband.
For example, if an African-American wife contributes between 90-100% of
household income, then her husband contributes the other 10-0%. At most,
the data described in the literature in Part II used the mean contributions to
household income of wives without class or racial breakdowns. This Part
will show that mean figures mask race, class, and gender distinctions and
make meaningful analysis impossible.
At each income level, African-American wives contribute a different
percentage of household income - a difference that mean figures do not
reveal. Those differing contributions determine the extent of the marriage
penalty paid by or marriage bonus received by each African-American house-
hold. Recall that marriage penalties are the highest when each spouse con-
tributes equally to household income and marriage bonuses are the greatest
when one spouse contributes all the income."
For African-American families earning up to $10,000, 42.27% of wives
contribute between 90 and 100% of household income, whereas 41.81% of
husbands contribute between 90 and 100% of household income."45 Thus, in
approximately 84% of African-American households earning $10,000 or less,
there are sole wage earners. 14 In low-income African-American households,
140. Id. at 116.
141. Id. at 100; Brown, supra note 2, at 49-50.
142. See infra note 146.
143. See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 2, at 994 ("[M]arried working women earn, on
average, forty-six percent of what their husbands do."). Such averages hide low-income wives
who are primary wage earners, obscure African-American wives who are equal wage earners,
and overstate the minimal household contribution of upper-income white women. See infra
notes 156-79 and accompanying text.
144. See supra Table 2.1, atp. 1480.
145. See infra Table 3.1, at p. 1492. For ease of discussion, households in which income
is split 90/10 will be referred to as single wage earner households.
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147. The information in Tables 3.1-3.6 is from 1990 Public Use Micro-Data Sample and
is based upon a 5% sample of the population of same race couples (on file with author). The
information is collected by the Census Bureau; however, it is not published. Census Bureau
data is used herein because the Internal Revenue Service does not keep data based upon race.
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wives are slightly more likely than their husbands to be the sole wage earner.141
Accordingly, the "traditional" model of a sole wage earner is present in
African-American families earning $10,000 or less, yet the sole wage earner
is slightly more likely to be the wife.4 9 Recall the severe marriage penalties
associated with the EITC for dual wage earner households. 5
For African-American families earning between $10,001 and $3 0,000,
the traditional sole wage earner model in which the sole wage earner is the
husband is the most prevalent.' In African-American families earning
between $10,001 and $20,000, husbands are almost twice as likely as their
wives to be the sole wage earner.'52 African-American wives are the sole
wage earner in 22.31% of the households at that level while husbands are the
sole wage earner in 41.09% of such households. 53 Again, this income group
is subject to severe EITC penalties for dual wage earner households. 54 At
that income level, approximately 63% of African-American couples reside in
"traditional" sole wage earner households, even though they might benefit
from the income of a second wage earner.
For African-American families earning between $20,001 and $30,000,
husbands are almost three times as likely as wives to be the sole wage
earner.'55 Wives are the sole wage earner in 10.37% of those households,
while husbands are the sole wage earner in 28.5 1%.156 At that income level,
15.70% of wives contribute between 40 and 50% to household income, with
their families paying a marriage tax penalty.'57 At this income level, one
begins to observe a more significant percentage of households in which the
marriage penalty falls the heaviest - in those families that are the least "tradi-
tional" because household income is split roughly equally.'58
See Brown, supra note 2, at 49; Dorothy A. Brown, Split Personalities: Tax Law and Critical
Race Theory, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 89, 91 (1997).
148. See supra Table 3.1, atp. 1492.
149. See supra Table 3.1, at p. 1492.
150. See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text (describing severe marriage penal-
ties associated with earned income tax credit as it applies to two-wage earner low-income
couples).
151. See supra Table 3.1, at p. 1492.
152. See supra Table 3.1, at p. 1492.
153. See supra Table 3.1, atp. 1492.
154. See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
155. See supra Table 3.1, at p. 1492 (showing that in households earning between $20,001
and $30,000, 28.51% of husbands were sole wage earners, while 10.37% of wives were sole
wage earners).
156. See supra Table 3.1, atp. 1492.
157. See supra Table 3.1, at p. 1492; see also supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
158. See supra Table 3.1, at p. 1492. For ease of discussion, households in which income
contributions fall in the 40-50 and 50-60 categories will be referred to as equal earning couples.
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For African-American families earning between $30,001 and $40,000,
wives contribute 40 to 50% of household income in 21.35% of the house-
holds." 9 In 20.84% of the households at that income level, husbands con-
tribute between 90 and 100% of the household income, and in 5.28%, wives
contribute between 90 and 100%.16 Given that marriage penalties are highest
in households in which husbands' and wives' contributions are roughly equal,
21.35% of the African-American families at this income level are paying the
highest marriage penalty."" Given that marriage bonuses are the highest when
household income is earned by one spouse, approximately 26% of the Afri-
can-American families at that income level are receiving marriage bonuses."
For African-American families with household income between $30,001
and $120,000, a greater percentage of wives contribute between 40 and 50%
to household income than any other contribution percentage.'63 Correspond-
ingly, their husbands contribute between 50 and 60% of household income."
Accordingly, when total household income is between $30,001 and $120,000,
more African-American couples pay marriage penalties than receive marriage
bonuses. Also, there are very few sole wage earning households at these
income levels. At the $30,001 to $40,000 income level, over 26% of African-
American households have sole wage earners, 21% of households have
African-American wives contributing 40 to 50% of household income, and
11% of households have African-American wives contributing 50 to 60% of
household income. 165 Between $50,001 and $120,000, less than 10% of
African-American families live in sole wage earner households.'
66
In African-American households in which income is greater than
$120,000, 31.94% of these households have husbands who contribute between
90 and 100% of total household income and 5.46% of these households have
wives who contribute between 90 and 100% of total household income.167
Accordingly, approximately 37% of African-American households earning
more than $120,000 receive a marriage bonus. At that same income level,
17.14% of African-American households, the next largest category, have
household income split roughly equally and thereby incur the highest marriage
penalties.
16
159. See supra Table 3.1, atp. 1492.
160. See supra Table 3.1, atp. 1492.
161. See supra Table 3.1, at p. 1492; see also supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
162. See supra Table 3.1, at p. 1492; supra note 51 and accompanying text.
163. See supra Table 3.1, atp. 1492.
164. See supra Table 3.1, at p. 1492.
165. See supra Table 3.1, atp. 1492.
166. See supra Table 3.1, at p. 1492.
167. See supra Table 3.1, at p. 1492.
168. See supra Table 3.1, atp. 1492.
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Four observations can be drawn from the information presented in Table
3.1. First, African-American wives are slightly more likely to be the primary
wage earner in households in which income is $10,000 and less. Second,
African-American wives are most likely to be the marginal wage earner in
households earning between $10,001 and $30,000. Third, African-American
wives are most likely to be equal contributors when household income is
between $30,001 and $120,000. Fourth, African-American wives are more
likely to be marginal wage earners in households earning over $120,000.
Therefore, at low income levels, African-American women are more likely to
be the primary wage earner; at middle income levels, African-American
women are most likely to be equal contributors and pay a high marriage pen-
alty; at upper income levels, African-American wives are more likely to be
marginal wage earners and receive marriage bonuses.
In very high income households, African-American men are significantly
more likely than their wives to be primary wage earners. At very low income
levels, African-American wives are equally likely to be primary wage earners
as their husbands. At the $10,001 to $30,000 income levels, African-Ameri-
can men are more likely to be the primary wage earners. Yet, the literature
tells us that men are more than five times more likely to be the single earner
in single-earner households.169 That statement is overinclusive with respect
to lower-income African-American households.
Further, at the middle income levels, African-American men are more
likely to contribute household income roughly equal to their wives. Neither
men as primary wage earners nor women as marginal wage earners is an accu-
rate description of African-American families at the middle income levels.
2. Household Contributions by White Husbands and Wives
This section examines the contributions to household income by white
husbands and wives.
Table 3.2 describes the different contributions to household income by
white wives. For white households with income $10,000 or less, 43.08% of
wives contribute between 90 and 100% of household income, and their
husbands contribute between 0 and 10%.17 Wives, not husbands, are primary
wage earners in approximately 43% of households earning $10,000 or less.17'
At that same income level, in 44.45% of households white husbands contrib-
ute between 90 and 100% of household income, and their wives between 0
and 10%.172 Almost 90% of white households earning $10,000 or less have
169. Supra note 50 and accompanying text.
170. See infra Table 3.2, at p. 1496.
171. See infra Table 3.2, at p. 1496.
172. See infra Table 3.2, at p. 1496.
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primarily one wage earner. 74 Notice, however, that a slightly higher percent-
age of white husbands are primary wage earners than white wives (as com-
173. See supra note 147.
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pared with African-American families in which wives are slightly more likely
to be the primary wage earner). 75
For every income level, a higher percentage of white wives contribute
between 0 and 10% to household income than any other contrib tion percent-
age.'76 Once beyond the EITC level, those households recei e a marriage
bonus. The percentage of white wives who contribute between and 10% to
total household income ranges from 44.45% at the $0 to $10,000 level to a
low of 23.47% for the $60,001 to $70,000 household income level and then
increases once again to a high of 57.70% in the over $120,000 household
income level.'77 These statistics suggest that the literature which describes
women as marginal wage earners is correct as applied to married white
women. Yet, upon closer examination, it masks another issue, namely that at
certain income levels a significant amount of white wives are not marginal
wage earners, but contribute roughly equal amounts to household income.
White wives' contributions to household income in instances in which
the marriage penalties are the greatest fall in the 40 to 50% - 50 to 60% cate-
gories. When these categories are combined one sees that a greater percentage
of white families pay the marriage penalty than receive the marriage bonus in
households in which the total income is between $60,001 and $90,000.178
Once household income exceeds $90,000, the percentage of white households
receiving a marriage bonus again exceeds the percentage of those paying the
marriage penalty.'79
Several observations can be made from Table 3.2. First, not all white
wives are marginal wage earners. Upper-income white wives are the most
likely to be marginal wage earners.8 ° The literature's description of all wives
as marginal wage earners is overinclusive as it ignores the significant per-
centage of white wives who are primary wage earners at the lower income
levels. Second, the literature ignores the percentage of white wives who
contribute between 40 and 60% of household income - namely the income
split in which the marriage penalty paid is the highest.'8 ' Simply because the
0 to 10% contribution category has the single highest concentration of white
wives does not eliminate the reality that many white wives contribute signifi-
cant amounts to household income at many different income levels and, as a
result, their households incur a marriage penalty. One commentator has
estimated that the average marriage penalty paid by married couples in 1994
175. See supra Table 3.2, at p. 1496; supra note 149 and accompanying text.
176. See supra Table 3.2, at p. 1496.
177. See supra Table 3.2, at p. 1496.
178. See supra Table 3.2, at p. 1496.
179. See supra Table 3.2, at p. 1496.
180. See supra Table 3.2, at p. 1496.
181. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (describing marriage penalty).
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was $1,244, and the average marriage bonus received by married couples was
$1,399."' Although that commentator did not provide a class- or race-based
analysis, given the data described in this Part, those averages significantly
mask race, class, and gender bias. One would expect that a significant number
of upper-income taxpayers would receive a marriage bonus to offset the sig-
nificant numbers of middle-income taxpayers who pay marriage penalties.
The literature's construction of men as primary wage earners and women
as marginal wage earners does not accurately describe all white families.'
First, white wives are almost as likely as their husbands to be primary wage
earners in households with income under $10,000. Second, white husbands
are primary wage earners in the majority of white households only in house-
holds in which income is over $120,000. At every other income level white
husbands are primary wage earners in less than one-half (and in one instance
less than one-quarter) of the white households at each income level. Thus, by
focusing on white households in which men are primary wage earners, the
literature ignores more than one-half, and in certain instances more than three-
fourths, of existing white households in which white wives make significant
contributions to household income.
Although Table 2.1 suggests that high-income couples pay a significant
marriage penalty if their contributions to household income are roughly
equal,' less than 10% of white couples in households in which family
income exceeds $120,000 have a 60/40-50/50 contribution ratio. 5 Instead,
almost 60% of upper-income white households fall within the marriage bonus
of Table 2.1.86
D. The Tax Consequences of Spousal Contributions to Household
Income by Race, Class, and Gender
This subpart describes the race, class, and gender bias of the three federal
tax policies outlined in Part II that the literature ignores. This subpart demon-
strates that the paradigm of primary/secondary wage earner does not apply to
many married couples. Specifically, this subpart makes three points. First,
the literature most accurately describes upper-income white households, yet
does not so limit its analysis."8 7 Second, the federal tax laws penalize equal
wage-earning couples and a disproportionate number of such penalized
182. See Brown, supra note 2, at 49 (citing DANiEL R. FEENBERG & HARvEY S. ROSEN,
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MARRIAGE TAX 11 (National Bureau ofEcon. Research Work-
ing Paper No. 4075, 1995)).
183. See supra Part I.
184. See supra Table 2.1, at p. 1480.
185. See supra Table 3.2, atp. 1496.
186. See supra Table 3.2, at p. 1496; supra Table 2.1, at p. 1480.
187. See infra notes 191-202 and accompanying text.
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couples are African-American.'" The literature could not make this point
because it ignores racial differences among households. Third, low-income
households are just as likely to have wives, instead of husbands, as the
primary wage earners, regardless of race, because the federal tax laws penalize
low-income households that have two wage earners.8 9 The literature ignores
this possibility insofar as it only views husbands as primary wage earners.'"9
1. The Literature Most Accurately Describes Upper-Income
White Households
The literature proposes that: (1) as the husband's income increases, the
participation rate of the wife's decreases;19" ' (2) the wage gap between hus-
bands and wives minimizes the wives' contributions to household income;"
(3) the family's economic survival is not dependent upon wives working
outside of the home; 93 (4) husbands earn considerably more in the work force
than their wives; 94 and (5) the tax laws encourage married women to work at
home.'95 This section will demonstrate that the literature describes primarily
the experiences of upper-income white households, not African-American
households or middle- or low-income white households.'96
Almost 60% of white husbands in households earning over $120,000
are primary wage earners, 197 whereas only approximately 30% of African-
American husbands in households earning over $120,000 are primary wage
earners.'9 Households in which one spouse earns all of the income receive
the greatest marriage bonus. Thus, upper-income white households receive
the greatest marriage bonuses under the federal tax laws. African-American
households also receive marriage bonuses but in a significantly smaller
percentage than represented by white households. Table 3.3 below shows that
a higher percentage of white families receive marriage bonuses than African-
American families at every income level.
Married white men earn higher incomes than married African-American
men.'" These higher wages permit more white wives to work inside the home
188. See infra notes 203-25 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 226-37 and accompanying text.
190. See supra Part II.
191. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 25, 31 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 26-27, 32 and accompanying text.
196. Cf Moran & Whitford, supra note 136, at 759-72 (describing how federal tax laws
benefit wealthy who are predominantly white).
197. See supra Table 3.2, at p. 1496.
198. See supra Table 3.1, at p. 1492.
199. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
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Table 3.3
GREATEST MARRIAGE BONUS BY INCOME LEVEL2 °
WHITE AFRICAN-AMERICAN
Household Income Income Split Income Split













so that the value of services they provide to their families is excluded from
taxable income. The tax law further benefits white couples with joint return
provisions that afford the greatest marriage bonus to households with sole
wage earners. Thus, the federal tax laws reward upper-income households
already benefitted by the labor market with a marriage bonus.
The model of the upper-income white male as primary wage earner with
the wife working at home satisfies the literature's description most accurately.
Upper-income white households have the lowest percentage contributions to
household income by wives.2 1 Wives in those households do not work in the
paid labor force, and thus their husbands earn virtually all of the household's
income.
200. See supra note 147.
201. See supra Table 3.3, atp. 1500.
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The largest percentage of married white women regardless of income
group is the category in which wives contribute between 0 and 10% to house-
hold income. 2 Accordingly, when the literature refers to married women as
marginal wage earners, its statements apply to white women. Although the
largest percentage of married white women contribute between 0 and 10% to
household income, there are various income groups in which married white
women contribute significantly more to household income. The less house-
hold income wives contribute, the less the marriage penalty and the greater the
possibility of a marriage bonus.
2. Federal Tax Laws Penalize Equal Wage-Earning Couples
a. African-American Households Pay the Greatest Marriage Penalty
African-American husbands earn significantly less than white hus-
bands."0 3 African-American wives cannot economically afford to stay home
and provide services to their families that escape taxation. African-American
wives most likely contribute between 40 and 50% to total household in-
come.2" African-American husbands contribute between 50 and 60% to total
household income.205
The federal tax laws penalize households in which husbands and wives
make roughly equal contributions to total household income and limit the
deductibility of work-related expenses that such taxpayers incur.2' Because
African-American wives make more significant contributions to household
income than white wives, a greater percentage of African-American families
pay a marriage penalty than white families at all income levels. 207 As a result,
the federal tax laws exacerbate the penalty that African-American families
suffer in the labor force.
The marriage tax penalty does not discourage African-American wives
from working in the waged labor market because of these women's economic
circumstances. African-American husbands receive lower wages than white
husbands and their wives receive lower wages than white wives.208 This, in
turn, provides an economic incentive for African-American wives to work
longer and harder and to incur a significant marriage tax penalty.
Table 3.4 below shows the percentage of families in which spouses
contribute roughly equal amounts and thereby incur the greatest marriage
202. See supra Table 3.2, at p. 1496.
203. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
204. See supra Table 3.1, at p. 1492.
205. See supra Table 3.1, atp. 1492.
206. See supra notes 54-58, 78 and accompanying text.
207. See infra Table 3.4, at p. 1502.
208. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
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penalties. As Table 3.4 shows, a greater percentage of African-American
families are in the marriage penalty category than white families.
Table 3.4GREATEST MARRIAGE PENALTY BY INCOME LEVEL2 9
WHITE AFRICAN-AMERICAN
Household Income Income Split Income Split













To speak of all husbands as primary wage earners ignores the very wage
discrimination that results in African-American married men earning signifi-
cantly less than white married men. As a result of African-American men
earning less income than white men, African-American wives are required to
contribute more towards household income. Thus, the literature that speaks
in terms of all men being primary wage earners ignores the experiences of
African-American households.
An examination of African-American households points out the flaws
found in the tax literature. First, the literature suggests that as the husband's
income increases, the participation rate of the wife decreases."' Yet, the
209. See supra note 147.
210. Supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
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greatest concentration of African-American wives is found at the 40 to 50%
contribution rate for all households in which income is between $30,001 and
$120,000.2' African-American wives make significant contributions even
when total household income increases.
Second, the literature informs us that the wage gap between wives and
their husbands minimizes the wives' contribution to total household income.212
The wage gap between African-American husbands and their wives is signifi-
cantly less than that between white husbands and their wives. African-Ameri-
can wives earn 76.57% of what African-American husbands earn, whereas
white wives earn 59.64% of what white husbands earn.213 Therefore, the wage
gap discussed in the literature is significantly diminished for African-Ameri-
can households. The lower wages of African-American men provide an
economic incentive for their wives to work more and seek to contribute
more.2 1 4 The income data for African-American households does not support
the fundamental premise of the literature that there is a significant wage gap
between husband and wife.
Third, the literature tells us that the family's survival is not dependent
upon wives working outside of the home.215 Although this may be accurate
for upper-income white households, it is decidedly untrue for African-Ameri-
can households in which each spouse contributes roughly equal amounts to
household income. When income is split equally, the family could not survive
without the wife participating in the paid labor force. Many African-Ameri-
can men simply do not earn amounts sufficient to provide the sole support so
their wives can have the option of remaining at home.
Fourth, the tax literature argues that the tax laws encourage married
women to remain at home.216 That is simply not true when applied to African-
American households. Although the tax laws may penalize their entry into the
workforce, the vast majority of African-American wives have no economic
choice but to work. Table 3.5 below shows that the greatest percentage of
African-American households with total income between $30,001 -$120,000
are found in the category with the highest marriage penalties, namely the co-
equal earner model.
211. See supra Table 3.1, at p. 1492.
212. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
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Table 3.5
AFRICAN-AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME ALLOCATION
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
2 17
Income Levels 100/0%- 90/10%- 80120%- 70/30%- 60/40%-
90/10% 8020% 70/30% 60/40% 50/50%
$0- 10,000 84.06% 3.60% 3.70% 3.57% 5.06%
$10,001 - 20,000 63.25% 7.32% 8.02% 8.76% 12.65%
$20,001 -30,000 38.81% 7.75% 12.20% 16.13% 25.11%
$30,001 - 40,000 26.07% 7.76% 12.94% 20.08% 33.16%
$40,001 - 50,000 15.42% 6.87% 13.70% 25.68% 38.33%
$50,001 - 60,000 9.22% 6.13% 14.00% 27.45% 43.21%
$60,001 - 70,000 6.37% 4.57% 14.13% 28.17% 46.76%
$70,001 - 80,000 6.59% 4.21% 11.73% 28.23% 49.23%
$80,001 - 90,000 5.88% 3.81% 14.62% 26.17% 49.53%
$90,001 - 100,000 6.55% 7.52% 14.90% 26.88% 44.15%
$100,001 - 120,000 9.24% 7.60% 18.35% 28.66% 36.15%
$120,001 & over 37.40% 14.54% 14.12% 11.98% 21.96%
b. In White Households, Middle-Income Families Pay the
Greatest Marriage Penalty
Although white middle-income taxpayers do not have as great a percent-
age of households in the marriage penalty category, their numbers are sig-
nificant. In middle-income white households, wives contribute significant
amounts to household income.21 Accordingly, the marriage penalties start to
appear here. Although the literature suggests that as the husband's income
increases, the participation rate of the wife decreases, there is no such evi-
217. See supra note 147.
218. See supra Table 3.2, at p. 1496.
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dence here.219 Middle-income white wives contribute roughly the same
proportions to total household income as total household income increases."
The percentage of such couples splitting household income roughly equally
is significant. Table 3.6 below sets forth the percentage of white families
based on spousal contribution levels to household income.
Table 3.6
WHITE HOUSEHOLD INCOME ALLOCATION
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE2
Contribution Percentages
Income Levels 100/0%- 90/10%- 80t20%- 70/30%- 60/40%-
90/10% 80/20% 70/30% 60/40% 50/50%
$0-10,000 87.49% 2.85% 2.89% 2.80% 3.97%
$10,001-20,000 69.11% 6.88% 7.18% 7.26% 9.58%
$20,001-30,000 53.21% 9.27% 10.87% 11.47% 15.18%
$30,001-40,000 41.63% 10.77% 12.79% 15.43% 19.38%
$40,001-50,000 32.87% 10.86% 14.39% 18.55% 23.33%
$50,001-60,000 27.00% 10.63% 14.77% 20.88% 26.72%
$60,001-70,000 24.15% 9.80% 16.44% 21.44% 28.17%
$70,001-80,000 26.06% 9.27% 14.63% 22.25% 27.79%
$80,001-90,000 26.54% 10.27% 15.98% 20.04% 27.17%
$90,001-100,000 35.98% 9.78% 14.52% 16.74% 22.97%
$100,001-120,000 36.61% 12.57% 15.17% 16.17% 19.48%
$120,001-over 58.88% 13.07% 10.47% 7.70% 9.42%
219. Cf. supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
220. See infra Table 3.6, at p. 1505.
221. See supra note 147.
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Further, the literature informs us that the wage gap between husbands and
their wives causes wives to contribute less to household income.2" In middle-
income white households, wives' and husbands' contributions remain similar
at various income levels.'
To the extent that the literature suggests that family economic survival
is not dependent upon the wife's economic contribution, it is most correct
with respect to upper-income white households.2" Middle-income white
families increasingly have come to rely on the wife's income - although to a
lesser degree than African-American families. The literature similarly does
not apply to middle-income white households in that it asserts that husbands
earn considerably more in the work force than their wives.'
3. Low-Income Wives Are Equally Likely to Be the Sole Wage Earner
In households earning $10,000 or less, white wives are almost as likely
as their husbands to be primary wage earners. 6 Accordingly, low-income
white husbands are not always the primary wage earner. These results are not
surprising given the severe tax penalties associated with the EITC if two
spouses contribute income.'
In households earning $10,000 or less, African-American wives are
slightly more likely to be the primary wage earner than their husbands. 8
Although Professor McCaffery acknowledges that the Code pushes lower-
income households towards the single-earner model, he never discusses the
possibility that the primary wage earner could be the wife. 9 Neither did any
other author.20
Further, the literature suggests that families' economic survival is not
dependent upon wives working outside of the home.3 This assertion simply
is not true when applied to low-income women, regardless of race, who are
primary wage earners. Lower-income white wives are almost as likely to be
the primary wage earner as white husbands. 2 If the primary wage earner is
222. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
223. See supra Table 3.6, at p. 1505.
224. See supra Table 3.6, at p. 1505.
225. See supra Table 3.6, at p. 1505.
226. See supra Table 3.2, at p. 1496.
227. See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text
228. See supra Table 3.1, at p. 1492.
229. See McCaffery, supra note 2, at 996, 1017.
230. See supra note 4 (quoting commentators who treat married women as secondary wage
earners).
231. See supra Part II.B.
232. See supra Table 3.2, at p. 1496.
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the wife, it simply cannot be correct to state that the family's economic
survival is not dependent upon the wife working outside of the home. This
assertion is less true with respect to African-American women who are more
likely to be the primary wage earner in African-American households than
their husbands.33
Similarly, the literature asserts that husbands earn considerably more in
the work force, which is inapplicable to low-income households in which
wives are the primary wage earners. 4 The statistic that men are five times
more likely to be the single earner in single earner households masks any race,
class, or gender implications. 5 Men are slightly more likely to be the
primary wage earner in low-income white households and women are slightly
more likely to be the primary wage earner in low-income African-American
households. 6 Contrary to what the literature suggests, the tax laws do not
encourage low-income married women to work at home when they are the
primary support for their families. 37 Low-income married women not only
work, but they are the primary wage earners in almost half of the households -
regardless of race.
4. Summary
The primary/secondary paradigm does not fit most households. A
significant percentage of white husbands provide between 90 and 100% of
household income only in households with income greater than $120,000.?
The highest concentration of primary wage-earnerAfrican-American husbands
is found in households earning up to $10,000." The literature's characteriza-
tion of households with primary and secondary wage earners is accurate
mainly with respect to upper-income white households. All other households
do not fit neatly into the literature's primary/secondary analysis. More white
households pay marriage penalties than the literature might suggest.240
Although most married men are not primary wage earners, white hus-
bands are still more likely to be primary wage earners than African-American
husbands at all income levels.241 As a result, white households are more likely
to enjoy a marriage bonus.
233. See supra Table 3.1, atp. 1492.
234. See supra Part II.B.
235. See supra Part II.B.
236. See supra Table 3.2, at p. 1496; supra Table 3.1, at p. 1492.
237. See supra Part II.B.
238. See supra Table 3.2, at p. 1496.
239. See supra Table 3.1, at p. 1492.
240. See supra Table 3.4, at p. 1502; supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
241. See supra Table 3.1, at p. 1492; supra Table 3.2, at p. 1496.
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IV. Tax Literature Solutions Perpetuate Class, Race, and Gender Biases
A. Introduction
This Part shows how, given the race, class, and gender implications of
the federal tax laws described in Part III, the literature's proposed solutions
do not improve the economic circumstances of many women. The literature's
proposed solutions are designed to encourage increased labor force participa-
tion.242 Those solutions have race, class, and gender implications which have
been previously ignored.
First, the proposals will have little impact on low-income wives who are
already primary wage earners. Second, the proposals will have little impact
on wives who contribute significant amounts to household income due to their
full-time labor. Third, the proposals designed to subsidize women as second-
ary wage earners by penalizing men as primary wage earners will have the
opposite effect in all households in which women are primary wage earners.
In general, the proposed solutions benefit only upper-income white women.
By focusing on increased labor participation as a solution to "gender"
bias, the literature ignores the possibility that work inside the home may be
valuable to women as well as the possibility that working more, given the
discrimination women experience, may be an inefficient solution. By focus-
ing on increased labor participation as the sole solution, the literature
perpetuates the race, class, and gender implications of who benefits in the paid
labor force and who loses.
B. The Literature's Solutions Perpetuate Race, Class, and Gender Bias
1. Abolish Joint Return
Mandatory individual filing would only eliminate marriage penalties and
marriage bonuses imposed by the federal tax laws. Individual filing would
have no impact on the race, class, and gender bias found in the waged labor
market.24 To the extent that married white men earn the most in the paid
labor force, they would continue to do so. Their total tax liability would be
dependent upon whether other federal tax law provisions would enable them
to minimize their tax liability. Studies suggest that certain married women,
namely those without children, those with reliable childcare, those with jobs
with flexible hours, and those with skilled careers, are more likely to increase
their labor market participation.2' Studies also suggest that married women
242. See supra Part II.D.
243. See Alstott, supra note 10, at 2024 ("Although individual filing obviously cannot
solve all women's economic problems, it may not even be a good first approach to addressing
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in low-wage work are less likely to benefit from increased waged labor.2 45 In
addition to those class distinctions, studies show that married women who
work at home tend to be white.246 Individual filing, therefore, has race, class,
and gender implications. That is, individual filing will benefit upper-income,
highly skilled white women who will then be able to enter the labor force.
Low-income, less highly skilled women will be unable to enter the market.
Additionally, African-American women already work in the paid labor market
to a great extent, and any proposal designed to encourage them to work more
misses the mark.
Those studies suggest that encouraging paid labor market participation
will increase the participation of nonworkers and will be less likely to increase
the participation of married women already in the paid labor market.247
Because nonworking married women are more likely white and working
married women are more likely African-American, 8 Professor Alstott has
noted that "advocates of individual filing ought to consider the possibility that
the largest tax incentives would accrue primarily to white, middle- and upper-
income housewives. '2 9
Thus, abolishing thejoint return would not eliminate wage discrimination
and therefore would not help those who are paid less because of their race or
gender, namely African-American families and white women.
2. Tax Imputed Income
Taxing imputed income penalizes those families in which the primary
wage earner earns enough income in the paid labor force to allow the other
spouse to work inside the home. These families are primarily middle- and
upper-income white families, as well as a few upper-income African-Ameri-
can families."0 Taxing imputed income could cause more women to enter the
paid labor force which could lead to higher taxable income. African-Ameri-
can women already participate in the waged labor market at higher percent-
ages than white women." To the extent that wage discrimination continues
to exist, married white women would continue to earn more than all other
women. One mightpredictthatas whitewomen and African-American women
seek jobs outside the home in the paid sector, employers would continue to
245. Id. at 2024-25.
246. Id. at 2025.
247. Id.
248. See Brown, supra note 2, at 49 ("Black women historically have entered the
workforce in larger numbers than white women and have stayed there longer.").
249. Alstott, supra note 10, at2025.
250. See supra Table 3.1, at p. 1492; supra Table 3.2, at p. 1496.
251. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
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favor hiring white women. 2 The tax laws would encourage women to enter
the paid labor force, but these laws would not favorably affect the supply of
jobs for those women. Given the discrimination African-American women
currently experience, one would again expect them to be disproportionately
left out or placed at the bottom of the paid labor force. If imputed income of
African-American wives was taxed but these women were without resources
to -pay their additional tax liability, the proposed solution would further
exacerbate the economic hardship caused by the race and gender discrimina-
tion African-American women and their families face. 3
In addition, if a joint return was still permitted, African-American
families would pay a disproportionately higher marriage penalty because
African-American wives and husbands earn wages proportionately closer to
each other than white wives and husbands.' Married white women, on the
other hand, earn a lower percentage of their husband's salary and would pay
a lower marriage penalty. 5 The proposal to tax imputed income would
perpetuate the race, class, and gender bias, and white families would continue
to pay the lowest marriage penalty while African-American families would
continue to pay the highest marriage penalty.
3. Provide Tax Incentives to Wives in the Paid Labor Force
Subsidizing married women by imposing a tax on the primary earner
would severely penalize lower-income wives who are the primary wage
earner. It would also penalize African-American families with no clear
primary wage earner and African-American wives who are the primary wage
earner. Yet the literature assumes that the husband is the primary wage
earner. Increasing the tax liability of African-American husbands who are
already paid less due to their race in the labor force would perpetuate the
racial bias of the federal tax laws. Professor Heen acknowledges that child
care credits are helpful in middle-class families, but the benefits are severely
limited in low- and upper-income families." Professor Heen also notes that
lower-income families cannot take full advantage of the credit because it is
nonrefundable, whereas upper-income families are limited in the amounts
252. Cf Brown, supra note 2, at 53 ("[D]uring the 1980s [white women] were more
successful than black women in breaking the glass ceiling.").
253. Cf Alstott, supra note 10, at 2024 ("ITihe relationship between market work and
women's economic well-being is also extremely complex and may vary by class, by race, and
by occupation."); Staudt, supra note 104, at 1574 ("Focusing solely on market labor as a means
to economic independence, for example, fails to acknowledge that many women who currently
participate in the market remain economically vulnerable.").
254. See supra notes 126, 128 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
256. Heen, supra note 51, at 189.
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expended which can be used for the credit calculation. 7 Although Professor
Heen acknowledges class distinctions among taxpayers, she does not mention
racial distinctions among taxpayers.
As a result of the data described in Part III of this Article, one could also
posit that greater deductions for child care expenses under Section 21 would
disproportionately help the middle- and upper-income white households which
could better afford to pay for child care. African-American households would
similarly receive child care deductions, but only to the extent that they could
afford to pay for the child care, a more difficult task given the wage discrimi-
nation African-Americans face in the paid labor market. In addition, Section
129 does not benefit the vast majority of married women with children
because only one-third of full-time employees at private firms were eligible
for such plans in 1991." The Section 129 exclusion provides the greatest
benefit for most middle- and upper-income taxpayers. 9 Increasing the
deduction or credit for child care expenses would perpetuate the class, race,
and gender biases of the federal tax laws.
4. Subsidize Employers that Hire Wives
A subsidy for employers that hire wives may subsidize employers that
continue to prefer hiring white women.2 0 Accordingly, this proposal would
subsidize firms that continue to discriminate against African-American men
and women. It could also subsidize employers that prefer highly-skilled labor
and would benefit highly-skilled upper-income white women to the detriment
of less-skilled workers.261 This again would perpetuate the discrimination by
employers on the basis of race, class, and gender.
5. Replace Progressive Rate Structure with Flat Tax
Taxing only wages, and not wealth, as the flat tax is designed to do,
would further perpetuate class, race, and gender biases. Studies show that
white families have a disproportionate amount of wealth relative to African-
American families.262 One would therefore expect a flat tax that excludes
257. See id. at 189-90.
258. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
259. See Heen, supra note 51, at 192.
260. See Brown, supra note 2, at 53 (describing white women as primary beneficiaries of
affirmative action).
261. Cf Alstott, supra note 10, at 2024-26 (positing that individual filing would likely
benefit highly-skilled upper-income women more than less-skilled lower-income women).
262. See MELVIN L. OLIvER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHTE WEALTH 7
(1995) ("Middle-class blacks, for example, earn seventy cents for every dollar earned by middle-
class whites but they possess only fifteen cents for every dollar of wealth held by middle-class
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wealth to cause African-American families to incur a higher tax liability. One
would also need to examine the gender dimension to wealth as well. This
solution would only exacerbate the race, class, and gender bias of the federal
tax laws.
V Conclusion
Tax literature that examines gender bias in the federal tax laws treats all
women alike. This gender essentialism leads commentators to propose solu-
tions that do not address the problems faced by many white women and
African-American women. This Article shows how federal tax laws either
benefit or penalize married women based upon their race, class, and gender.
Further, this Article shows how the gender bias literature's focus on wives as
secondary wage earners ignores how federal tax laws benefit upper-income
white families and penalize African-American families and middle- and low-
income white families.263 Perhaps, if the literature acknowledged the race and
class differences among women, one could observe the tax penalties paid by
low- and middle-income white wives and all African-American wives when
compared to the tax benefits disproportionately received by upper-income
white wives.
The race, class, and gender bias in the federal tax laws must be examined
and acknowledged. Only then can solutions be designed to assist all women.
This Article takes a first step in that process.
whites."); see also Moran & Whitford, supra note 136, at 759-72 (discussing tax consequences
of racial wealth disparity).
263. Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (stating that "this principle of interest convergence provides:
The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges
with the interests of whites").
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